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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Larry Corwin appeals from his judgment of conviction and sentence for felony 
driving under the influence, along with a persistent violator sentencing enhancement. 
On appeal, he asserts that the prosecutor committed misconduct during closing 
arguments, and that this misconduct rose to the level of a fundamental error. 
Accordingly, Mr. Corwin asserts that his judgment of conviction and sentence should be 
vacated in light of the fact that this misconduct deprived him of his due process rights to 
fairness in his trial proceedings and because this error was not harmless. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Larry Dean Corwin was originally charged with felony driving under the influence, 
with a persistent violator sentencing enhancement, and was convicted following a jury 
trial. (35305 R.1, pp.26-27, 36-38, 74-77.) During the pendency of his appeal, his case 
was remanded back to district court by stipulation of the parties for a new trial. (35305 
Order to Vacate Judgment; Remand for New Trial and Dismiss Appeal With Prejudice, 
entered on November 4, 2009.) 
Following remand, the State filed an amended information charging Mr. Corwin 
with felony driving under the influence. (R., pp.42-43.) This information alleged as 
alternate bases for the felony enhancement that Mr. Corwin had previously been 
convicted of felony driving under the influence (DUI) within 15 years of his present 
1 The Idaho Supreme Court has ordered that the Reporter's Transcript and Clerk's 
Record from Mr. Corwin's prior appeal in this case be augmented into the record 
through its Order Augmenting Appeal in this case. (R., p.2.) 
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alleged offense and/or that he had two prior DUI convictions within the previous 1 O 
years. (R., pp.42-43.) 
At trial, the State presented only one witness: Officer Darrell Meacham of the 
Ada County Sheriff's Office. (Tr.2, p.173, Ls.8-13.) The officer testified that he had 
been trained in how to perform field sobriety tests and also in how to use breath testing 
equipment for purposes of determining whether an individual is driving under the 
influence. (Tr., p.175, L.23 - p.176, L.3.) After explaining to the jury the process of 
administering field sobriety tests, Officer Meacham turned to the night that Mr. Corwin 
was alleged to have been driving under the influence. (Tr., p.178, L.8 - p.187, L.24.) 
Officer Meacham was the officer who had originally pulled Mr. Corwin over. 
(Tr., p.187, L.20 - p.188, L.23.) According to his testimony, there was only one aspect 
of Mr. Corwin's driving pattern that aroused the officer's suspicions: Mr. Corwin 
allegedly failed to dim his high beams on the truck he was driving as he passed the 
officer's vehicle. (Tr., p.188, Ls.16-23.) The officer then turned his car around and 
began to follow the truck Mr. Corwin was driving. (Tr., p.189, L.16 - p.191, L.6.) 
Mr. Corwin had no observable driving impairment while the officer was following 
him: he did not execute any turns too widely, follow any other cars too closely, signal 
inconsistently with his drivi11g actions, cross over any traffic lanes, fail to signal, swerve, 
or make any abrupt turns. (Tr., p.245, L.5 - p.247, L.3.) The officer specifically testified 
that, during the time he was following Mr. Corwin's car, he did not notice anything else 
regarding his driving pattern that aroused his suspicions. (Tr., p.243, Ls.15-18.) The 
only other thing that Officer Meacham thought was odd was that Mr. Corwin pulled his 
2 Unless otherwise indicated, citations herein to the transcript refer to the primary 
volume of transcripts of the proceedings that includes Mr. Corwin's trial and sentencing. 
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truck into a subdivision that was not yet occupied, as all of the houses were still under 
construction. (Tr., p.190, L.23 - p.191, L.6.) Officer Meacham testified that he pulled 
Mr. Corwin over at this housing subdivision. (Tr., p.192, Ls.7-17.) Mr. Corwin also 
responded immediately when the officer signaled him to pull over and did not give any 
indication of attempting to elude the officer. (Tr., p.248, Ls.8-17.) 
In talking to Mr. Corwin, Officer Meacham testified that Mr. Corwin's eyes were, 
"bloodshot and glassy," and that Mr. Corwin had slurred speech. (Tr., p.198, Ls.4-11.) 
He further testified that these were "the kinds of things [law enforcement officers] look 
for in intoxicated people." (Tr., p.198, Ls.16-19.) However, the officer also admitted 
that he was not familiar with Mr. Corwin's normal speech patterns and whether his 
speech on the evening in question was different than Mr. Corwin's normal mode of 
speaking. (Tr., p.251, L.11 - p.252, L.3.) When Mr. Corwin got out of the truck at the 
officer's request, Officer Meacham testified that he smelled the odor of alcohol coming 
from him. (Tr., p.199, L.25 - p.200, L.4.) At this time, Mr. Corwin denied having had 
anything to drink. (Tr., p.200, Ls.5-15.) 
According to his testimony, Officer Meacham did not see Mr. Corwin fall over, 
stumble, or lean on the truck in order to balance himself. (Tr., p.255, L.20 - p.256, L.2.) 
The officer had Mr. Corwin perform three field sobriety tests: the horizontal gaze 
nystagmus test, the "walk and turn" test, and the "one-leg stand" test. (Tr., p.201, L.14 
- p.209, L.12.) Regarding Mr. Corwin's performance on the walk and turn test, Officer 
Meacham testified that Mr. Corwin appeared to be swaying, missed several heel-to-toe 
maneuvers, was not walking in a straight line, raised his arms, and spun around to turn 
around rather than taking several small steps as instructed. (Tr., p.206, Ls.18-14.) 
Officer Meacham also acknowledged that there was no physical "line" for Mr. Corwin to 
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follow for purposes of the walk and turn test - a test that measures, in part, whether an 
individual can walk heel-to-toe in a straight line - even though the officer used 
Mr. Corwin's failure to walk along this imaginary line as part of his basis in findi17g that 
Mr. Corwin failed this test. (Tr., p.183, L.15- p.184, L.23, p.267, L.21 - p.268, L.12.) 
Officer Meacham similarly testified that Mr. Corwin did not pass the other two 
field sobriety tests that were administered. (Tr., p.201, L.20 - p.209, L.6.) When asked 
by the officer as to how he thought he did on the tests, Mr. Corwin allegedly said that he 
failed them, but also explained that his performance was probably the result of his being 
tired. (Tr., p.209, Ls.13-25.) Based upon Mr. Garwin's performance on the field 
sobriety tests, Officer Meacham testified as to his belief that Mr. Corwin was under the 
influence of alcohol. (Tr., p.210, Ls.8-13.) 
Given his assessment, Officer Meacham then arrested Mr. Corwin for driving 
under the influence of alcohol and transported him to the Ada County Jail. (Tr., p.210, 
L.20 - p.213, L.3.) Prior to transporting him, the officer searched the truck that 
Mr. Corwin was driving and found a bottle of vodka under the passenger seat that was 
one quarter full, along with a glass of soda mixed with what Officer Meacham believed 
was alcohol. (Tr., p.212, Ls.10-15.) It was Officer Meacham's belief that the bottle of 
vodka and the mixed drink actually belonged to the passenger in Mr. Corwin's truck, 
Sunday Bender, rather than Mr. Corwin.3 (Tr., p.285, L.5 - p.286, L.11.) 
When Mr. Corwin performed the alcohol breath test, the results came back as 
0.083 and 0.085 - above the legal limit of 0.08. (Tr., p.233, L.15 - p.234, L.4.) 
However, according to the officer, this test was not administered until approximately two 
3 Ms. Bender is referred to alternately in the proceedings as "Sunday Bender," "Nancy 
Bender," "Sunday Corwin," and "Nancy Corwin." 
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hours and fifteen minutes after Mr. Corwin was initially pulled over. (Tr., p.237, L.25 -
p.238, L.13.) Officer Meacham also admitted that, among the factors that can affect the 
reliability of this test is the passage of time so that Mr. Corwin's breath alcohol 
concentration could vary overtime. (Tr., p.282, Ls.1-7.) 
The State rested following Officer Meacham's testimony. (Tr., p.291, L.20.) 
Mr. Corwin likewise presented one witness at trial - Tammy Cecil. (Tr., p.298, 
L.16 - p.299, L.6.) Ms. Cecil was a friend and co-worker of Mr. Corwin's who was also 
with him for the entire day and much of the evening of his alleged DUI. (Tr., p.300, L.6 
- p.306, L.3.) Mr. Corwin, Ms. Bender and Ms. Cecil were also living in the same 
residence at that time. (Tr., p.302, Ls.16-19.) Being familiar with Mr. Corwin, Ms. Cecil 
informed the jury that he had a slurred pattern of speech attributable to his southern 
accent and to the fact that Mr. Corwin had dental issues that affected his speaking. 
(Tr., p.299, L.11 - p.300, L.1.) 
That day, Ms. Cecil, Ms. Bender, and Mr. Corwin were all doing landscaping 
work at a residence from early in the morning until it began to get dark. (Tr., p.300, L.6 
- p.301, L.10.) According to Ms. Cecil's testimony, Mr. Corwin was engaged in physical 
labor that day, and further had to unload debris from the truck even after the work day 
ended. (Tr., p.301, L.11 - p.303, L.1.) 
That evening, after Mr. Corwin unloaded the truck, the three ate dinner and 
began to watch a movie when Mr. Corwin was called by a friend whose truck had 
broken down. (Tr., p.303, L.6 - p.304, L.25.) Mr. Corwin and Ms. Bender then left to go 
help this friend with his truck. (Tr., p.305, L.1 - p.306, L.34.) Ms. Cecil testified that 
Mr. Corwin had not been drinking at all to her knowledge prior to leaving the house to 
go help his friend. (Tr., p.303, L.19 - p.304, L.4.) 
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During closing arguments, Mr. Corwin noted with regard to his performance on 
the walk-and-turn field sobriety test that there was no actual, observable line that he 
could have used as a guide when performing this test. (Tr., p.357, Ls.2-10.) He then 
argued that it was possible that Officer Meacham's assessment that he had not been 
walking in a straight line could have been the product of "the human element" - i.e., that 
whether Mr. Corwin was walking a straight line could have been an issue of a difference 
of perspective between Mr. Corwin and the officer. (Tr., p.357, Ls.2-10.) 
Thereafter, in closing argument, the prosecutor made the following remarks: 
[Trial counsel] said -- I think I wrote this down right -- Mr. Corwin was 
walking straight from his perspective, but not from the officer's 
perspective. Even with all the evidence in this case, I'm glad we're looking 
at this from the officer's perspective. From Mr. Corwin's perspective, if 
that was a straight line, then we're all in trouble because he had to -- when 
he fell off line, which is exactly what we're talking about at that point, when 
he stepped off line by a foot, he did so to stop himself from falling over. 
So the line from his point of view was crooked and careening down to the 
ground. That's -- that's not the type of line we want a driver to follow. 
(Tr., p.370, Ls.4-17.) 
The jury convicted Mr. Corwin of driving under the influence. (Tr., p.382, Ls.1-4; 
R., p.140.) Additionally, the jury found that Mr. Corwin was eligible for both of the felony 
enhancements alleged by the State - i.e., that he had been convicted of DUI on at least 
two prior occasions within the previous ten years and that, within the prior 15 years of 
the alleged offense, he had been convicted of felony DUI. (Tr., p.419, L.23 - p.420, 
L.15; R., p.141.) Finally, the jury found that Mr. Corwin was a persistent violator of the 
law, and was therefore subject to the persistent violator sentencing enhancement. 
(Tr., p.432, Ls.13-19; R., p.142.) 
The district court sentenced Mr. Corwin to 20 years, with 10 years fixed, upon his 
conviction for felony DUI along with the persistent violator sentencing enhancement 
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(R., pp.186-189.) Thereafter, Mr. Corwin filed a timely Idaho Criminal Rule 35 motion 
seeking a reduction of his sentence. (Motion for Reconsideration of Sentence, 
augment; Addendum to Defendant's Motion Pursuant to ICR 35, augment.) The district 
court subsequently granted Mr. Corwin's request for a reduction of his sentence in part. 
(Memorandum Decision Reconsidering Defendant's Sentence, augment.) Specifically, 
the court reduced the fixed term of Mr. Corwin's sentence by five years while keeping 
his aggregate sentence at thirty years, resulting in an underlying sentence of 30 years, 
with five years fixed. (Memorandum Decision Reconsidering Defendant's Sentence, 
augment.) 




Did the prosecutor commit misconduct, rising to the level of a fundamental error, during 
closing arguments when the prosecutor mischaracterized Mr. Corwin's arguments, 
appealed to the passion and prejudice of the jury, and misstated the law regarding the 
jury's right to determine all facts relevant to the issues at trial? 
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ARGUMENT 
The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct, Rising To The Level Of A Fundamental Error, 
During Closing Arguments When The Prosecutor Mischaracterized Mr. Corwin's 
Arguments, Appealed To The Passion And Prejudice Of The Jury, And Misstated The 
Law Regarding The Jury's Right To Determine All Facts Relevant To The Issues At Trial 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Corwin asserts that the prosecutor committed misconduct during closing 
arguments, rising to the level of a fundamental error, when the prosecutor 
mischaracterized Mr. Corwin's arguments at trial, misstated the law, and appealed to 
the passions and prejudice of the jurors. 
B. Standard Of Review 
In cases where the defendant fails to object to prosecutorial misconduct at trial, 
this Court will review the alleged error for whether the misconduct alleged rises to the 
level of a fundamental error. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 226 (2010). In cases of 
unobjected to error, this Court applies a three-step process of review. First, the 
defendant must demonstrate that one or more of the defendant's unwaived 
constitutional rights were violated. Id. Second, the error must be clear and obvious 
from the record without the need of additional information not contained within the 
record on appeal. Id. Finally, the defendant must show that the error affected the 
defendant's substantial rights. Id. As to this last prong, the defendant must show a 
reasonable possibility that the error complained of affected the outcome of the trial. 
9 
C. The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct. Rising To The Level Of A Fundamental 
Error, During Closing Arguments In This Case 
During closing arguments, the prosecutor made the following statement 
regarding Mr. Corwin's performance during one of the field sobriety tests administered 
by Officer Meacham prior to Mr. Corwin's arrest: 
[Trial counsel] said -- I think I wrote this down right -- Mr. Corwin was 
walking straight from his perspective, but not from the officer's 
perspective. Even with all the evidence in this case, I'm glad we're looking 
at this from the officer's perspective. From Mr. Corwin's perspective, if 
that was a straight line, then we're all in trouble because he had to -- when 
he fell off line, which is exactly what we're talking about at that point, when 
he stepped off line by a foot, he did so to stop himself from falling over. 
So the line from his point of view was crooked and careening down to the 
ground. That's -- that's not the type of line we want a driver to follow. 
(Tr., p.370, Ls.4-17.) 
This argument by the prosecutor was improper, and violated Mr. Corwin's 
constitutional right to due process and to a jury determination on the facts in three ways. 
First, the prosecutor in this case misstated Mr. Corwin's actual arguments in his 
defense. The prosecutor implied that Mr. Corwin was arguing to the jury that they had 
to defer to his personal assessment of his performance during the field sobriety tests in 
weighing the evidence of whether Mr. Corwin was intoxicated. However, this is not 
what Mr. Corwin argued. 
During closing arguments, Mr. Corwin noted that the evidence at trial showed 
that there was no observable "line," such as a fog line or a chalk line, that Mr. Corwin 
could have used as an objective measure when performing the walk-and-turn test. 
(Tr., p.356, L.23 - p.357, L.14.) In absence of such a line, Mr. Corwin argued that the 
human element could have played a role in the officer's assessment of Mr. Corwin's 
performance on this test - i.e., that it could have been a matter of the officer's subjective 
perspective while observing Mr. Corwin that he was not walking along a straight line. 
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(Tr., p.356, L.23 - p.357, L.14.} Mr. Corwin specifically argued that this was a factor 
that the jury should weigh in determining the reliability of Mr. Corwin's purported 
performance on this test. (Tr., p.357, Ls.3-14.) Mr. Corwin never argued that his own 
subjective assessment should control the jury's determination as to whether Mr. Corwin 
showed indications of intoxication. 
Among the protections of the due process clause is the guarantee of the right of 
a criminal defendant to fairly present his defense at trial. See, e.g., State v. Marlin, 146 
Idaho 357, 361 (Ct. App. 2008) (quoting Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 76 (1985)). 
This right to due process may be violated where a prosecutor mischaracterizes the 
defendant's arguments at trial, particularly when this mischaracterization is linked to a 
subsequent appeal to the passion or prejudice of the jury. State v. Troutman, 148 Idaho 
904, 909-10 (2010}. Immediately after implying that Mr. Corwin had argued that the jury 
should view the walk-and-turn solely from his perspective, the State asserted to the jury 
that, "we're all in trouble," if they believed Mr. Corwin's argument. (Tr., p.370, Ls.4-17.) 
As such, the prosecutor not only mischaracterized what Mr. Corwin had argued to the 
jury, but also injected an appeal to the jury's fears if they accepted the State's 
characterization of Mr. Corwin's defense. In doing so, the prosecutor violated 
Mr. Corwin's due process right to a fair trial. 
Second, as was noted, the prosecutor injected an impermissible appeal to the 
passions and prejudice of the jurors into his closing argument, and this also violated 
Mr. Corwin's right to a fair trial. After mischaracterizing Mr. Corwin's arguments in his 
defense, the prosecutor then cautioned the jury that "we're all in trouble," if the jury were 
to credit what the prosecutor attributed as Mr. Corwin's defense. (Tr., p.370, Ls.4-17.) 
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This argument was intended to play on the fears of the jurors were they to acquit 
Mr. Corwin of the State's charges, and was plainly imp roper. 
It is so well-established as to be axiomatic that it is improper for a prosecutor to 
appeal to the passions and prejudice of the jury, or to appeal to the emotions of the 
jurors, in an attempt to seek a conviction. See, e.g., Perry, 150 Idaho at 227; State v. 
Johnson, 149 Idaho 259, 266 (2010); State v. Gross, 146 Idaho 15, 20-21 (Ct. App. 
2008); State v. Beebe, 145 Idaho 570, 575 (Ct. App. 2007); State v. Baruth, 107 Idaho 
651, 656-657 (Ct. App. 1984). Such appeals include arguments by the prosecutor that 
seek to secure a conviction through arguing that a conviction is necessary to prevent 
future crimes or to protect the public at large. Beebe, 145 Idaho at 575; Baruth, 107 
Idaho at 656-657. "Where a prosecutor attempts to secure a verdict on any factor other 
than the law as set forth in the jury instructions and the evidence admitted at trial, 
including reasonable inferences from that evidence, this impacts a defendant's 
Fourteenth Amendment right to a fair trial." Perry, 150 Idaho at 227. 
The prosecutor in this case made just such an improper appeal to the jurors. In 
miscasting Mr. Garwin's arguments as an assertion that the jurors should view his 
performance on one of the field sobriety tests solely from his point of view, the 
prosecutor thereafter cautioned the jury that, "we're all in trouble," if they did so. 
(Tr., p.370, Ls.4-17.) Just as in Troutman, this was an improper appeal to the emotions 
of the jury that was tied to a misstatement of Mr. Corwin's arguments. And, just as in 
Troutman, this violated Mr. Corwin's constitutional right to a fair trial. 
Finally, the prosecutor in this case impliedly argued to the jury that they were 
required to defer to Officer Meacham's assessment of Mr. Corwin's performance on the 
field sobriety test, rather than to weigh the import of this evidence on their own. In doing 
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so, the prosecutor misstated the law as to the jury's right to make its own independent 
assessment of the evidence at trial. During closing arguments, the prosecution stated to 
the jury with regard to how to evaluate Mr. Corwin's performance on the field sobriety 
tests that, "I'm glad we're looking at this from the officer's perspective." (Tr., p.370, 
Ls.4-17.) The prosecutor's remarks were directed at the jurors - and this statement 
was in relation to how these jurors were to evaluate the evidence of Mr. Corwin's 
performance on the field sobriety tests. In implying that the jury was required to 
measure and view Mr. Corwin's performance on the field sobriety tests from the 
perspective of Officer Meacham, the prosecutor misstated the law in a manner that 
deprived Mr. Corwin of his right to due process and to a jury determination as to the 
material facts. 
It is well-established in Idaho that it is the sole province and function of the jury to 
determine the credibility of the evidence, and assign whatever weight or significance to 
that evidence as the jury deems appropriate. See, e.g., Perry, 150 Idaho at 229. In 
doing so, it is the jury's province to determine what weight, if any, to give to the 
testimony of any witness. See, e.g., State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726 (2007). In fact, 
it is the right of the jury to make these determinations independently. See, e.g., 
State v. Daniels, 134 Idaho 896, 898 (2000); State v. Button, 134 Idaho 864, 869 
(Ct. App. 2000); State v. Aguilar, 103 Idaho 578, 590 (1982). 
Given the plain state of the law, which accords only the jury the right to make a 
determination as to the credibility of the witnesses, it is a misstatement of the law for the 
State to assert that the power to assess the weight or import of the evidence belongs 
instead to any particular witness for the State or to any other party to the proceedings. 
See, e.g., State v. Phillips, 144 Idaho 82, 86 (Ct. App. 2007) (holding that closing 
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argument should not include opinions about credibility of the witnesses or 
misstatements of the applicable law). And a prosecutor's misstatement of the law in 
seeking to obtain a conviction can rise to the level of a due process violation. Perry, 
150 Idaho at 227. 
Each of these errors are plain from the face of the appellate record and were not 
the result of any tactical decision on the part of trial counsel in failing to object. 
Mr. Corwin received no strategic benefit from the prosecutor seeking to induce the jury 
to decide his guilt or innocence based upon misstatements of the law, 
mischaracterizations of his defense, or appeals to the jurors' emotions. 
And there is a reasonable possibility that each of these instances of prosecutorial 
misconduct may have contributed to the jury's verdict. First, this portion of the State's 
argument came during its rebuttal, which has been held to be an important factor in the 
determination of harmless error. Troutman, 148 Idaho at 909-910. As noted by the 
Troutman court, "It is also important to note that this misconduct by the prosecutor 
occurred in rebuttal argument. At this point in the trial the state has the last word and is 
in a position to leave a lasting impression on the jury." Troutman, 148 Idaho at 909-910. 
Here, as in Troutman, the prosecutor's improper remarks came at a time when 
the state had the last word on the evidence, and on how the jury should render their 
decision in Mr. Corwin's case. Because this misconduct urged the jury to render its 
verdict based upon facts outside the evidence, as well as misstatements of the law, this 
final word left the jury with the lasting impression that they should extend their 
deliberations to considerations that were improper. 
Moreover, the strength of the State's overall evidence in this case was not 
overwhelming. Although the State presented evidence of Mr. Corwin's breath test for 
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alcohol that registered amounts above the legal limit, his results were only 0.083 and 
0.085. (Tr., p.233, L.15 - p.234, L.4.) In addition, this test was not administered until 
approximately two hours and fifteen minutes after Mr. Corwin was initially pulled over; 
and Officer Meacham testified that a person's breath alcohol concentration varies over 
the passage of time. (Tr., p.237, L.25-p.238, L.13, p.282, Ls.1-7.) 
Additionally, Mr. Corwin exhibited no pattern of actual impairment in his driving 
other than his failure to dim his high beams when passing the officer. (Tr., p.188, Ls.16-
23; p.243, L.15 - p.247, L.3.) In the absence of any other significant showing that 
Mr. Corwin's ability to drive was actually impaired, Officer Meacham's testimony 
regarding Mr. Corwin's performance on the field sobriety tests was critical to the jury's 
overall assessment of the evidence. Because the misconduct in this case related to this 
issue, and because Mr. Corwin raised several doubts during cross-examination 
regarding the officer's assessment of his performance on the field sobriety tests, there is 
a reasonable possibility that the prosecutor's misconduct in this case contributed to the 
jury's verdict Accordingly, the misconduct in this case rises to the level of a 
fundamental error requiring reversal of Mr. Corwin's judgment of conviction for driving 
under the influence. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Corwin respectfully requests that this Court reverse his judgment of 
conviction and sentence, and remand this case for further proceedings. 
DATED this 16th day of March, 2011. 
SARAH E. TOMPKINS v 
/L/··J 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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